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On January 23, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark 
non-decision in United States v. Jones.  In that case, officers used 
a GPS-enabled device to track a suspect’s public movements for 
four weeks, amassing a considerable amount of data in the 
process.  Although ultimately resolved on narrow grounds, five 
Justices joined concurring opinions in Jones expressing sympathy 
for some version of the “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment 
privacy.  This theory holds that we maintain reasonable 
expectations of privacy in certain quantities of information even if 
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we do not have such expectations in the constituent parts.  This 
Article examines and explores the mosaic theory.  This Article 
concludes that the mosaic theory exposes an important quantitative 
dimension of Fourth Amendment privacy but raises serious 
practical challenges, which, as argued elsewhere, can be met by 
regulating surveillance technologies capable of facilitating broad 
programs of indiscriminate surveillance. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the first etchings of the ancients, integrity and 
authenticity have stood as pillars of ethics.  Whether inspired by 
religious faith or deontological reflection, the very concepts of a 
good life and a life well-lived imply the pursuit of some measure 
of coherency, consistency, and self-possession.  This search for 
order is distinguished from the otherwise fragmented moments, 
contexts, and pursuits that occupy our existences.  From a 
phenomenological point of view, this amounts to a tautology.  
After all, the notion of the self is tied to persistence of identity 
through time and space.1 
Beyond questions of description and definition, however, lie 
more compelling questions of freedom, liberty, dominance, and 
oppression.  Although it is a necessary condition of liberty, 
persistence of identity through time is hardly sufficient to secure 
liberty.  In fact, it is a point of vulnerability.  What better marker of 
oppression could we imagine than using disciplinary structures to 
occupy and control experiences, places, and activities in order to 
shape and construct the identities and lives of subjects? 
Some have argued that even a fully constructed self is “free” in 
the sense that conduct is neither coerced nor compelled against 
one’s will. 2   But this account of freedom is far too thin to 
accommodate American conceptions of liberty.  When we declare 
                                                 
1 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 226–27 
(T. Tegg and Son, 27th ed. 1836) (1690). 
2 See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS 271 (1969). 
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the inalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”3 
we mean more than mere freedom from external constraint.  We 
herald both the right to define for ourselves what that good life 
entails and to pursue it free from unreasonable constraint.  In this 
thicker, ethical sense, to be free is to pursue a lifelong process of 
self-understanding and self-development.  A state committed to 
securing this brand of liberty for its citizens must therefore do 
more than merely protect individuals from situational coercion; it 
must secure the space needed to become and to be.  In keeping 
with our commitments to this brand of liberty, we provide broad 
constitutional protections for freedom of speech, conscience, and 
religion. 
Understood as the conditions necessary to our projects of 
ethical self-construction, freedom and liberty naturally entail 
privacy.  Observation and surveillance are mainstays for programs 
of discipline and constraint.  Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon 
provides the most ready trope, 4  but, as Michel Foucault has 
documented, surveillance, and the ambient possibility of 
surveillance, play central roles in a wide range of institutions—
such as prisons, schools, and mental institutions—that are designed 
to constrain and construct their subjects.5  In the proper context, 
and subject to appropriate controls, these tools of constitutive 
observation play an important and necessary social role.  Plato’s 
famous parable of the Ring of Gyges paints a vivid picture of the 
alternative, showing us the deleterious effects of absolute 
anonymity on behavior and character. 6   Because it leads to 
                                                 
3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
4 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON:  OR THE INSPECTION HOUSE 
(1791) (stating that a Panopticon is a rotunda in which the observers are situated 
in the center and the observed occupy the outer area, allowing a small number of 
observers to watch over a large number of subjects). 
5 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF 
THE PRISON 195–210 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) 
(explaining how prisons use both surveillance and the threat of surveillance to 
modify prisoner conduct and consciousness). 
6  Plato, Republic:  Book II, in FIVE GREAT DIALOGUES 253, 484 (Louise 
Ropes Loomis ed., B. Jowett trans., 1942).  The parable is as follows: 
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conformity with rules and norms,7 surveillance is, in this sense, a 
necessary condition of self and society, and therefore liberty as 
well.  Thus, in the United Kingdom, which monitors various 
locations using a sizeable closed-circuit television program, the 
House of Lords found that the constant surveillance made people 
feel more “safe,” even when the program showed “mixed results” 
in crime detection and prevention.8  At the same time, surveillance 
can also be a tool of oppression.  That is why programs of broad 
and indiscriminate surveillance are frequent hallmarks of 
tyrannical regimes, both real and fictitious.9 
                                                 
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings [allowing the wearer to 
become invisible], and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; 
no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand 
fast in justice.  No man would keep his hands off what was not his own 
when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses 
and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he 
would, and in all respects be like a god among men . . . . And this we may 
truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because 
he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for 
wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust . . . . 
If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, 
and never doing any wrong or touching what was another’s, he would be 
thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would 
praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one 
another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. 
Id. at 257–59. 
7 Even images of eyes can lead to more honest behavior, as researchers found 
in a study that showed more people cleaned up after themselves in a cafeteria 
when there was a poster of eyes instead of flowers.  Sander van der Linden, How 
the Illusion of Being Observed Can Make You a Better Person, SCI. AM. (May 3, 
2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-the-illusion-of-
being-observed-can-make-you-better-person. 
8 CONSTITUTIONAL Committee, SURVEILLANCE:  CITIZENS AND THE STATE, 
2008–9, H.L. 18-I, ¶¶ 70–78 (U.K.), available at http://www.public
ations.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf.  
9 See ORLANDO FIGES, THE WHISPERERS:  PRIVATE LIFE IN STALIN’S RUSSIA 
258–59 (Picador reprint 2008) (2007) (describing a system of “mutual 
surveillance” in which people were expected to spy on their families, coworkers 
and neighbors, including those living with them in communal apartments); 
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Rosetta Books ed. 2000) (1949) (painting a vivid 
picture of life under a regime that exercises constant surveillance as a tool of 
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For these reasons, surveillance presents a bit of a conundrum 
for social and political theory because it is at once a condition of a 
free self and a potential threat against liberty.  A central 
preoccupation of information privacy law scholars has been to 
chart the boundaries between observational and surveillance 
practices that are liberty enhancing and those that are liberty 
denying.  At least since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
canonical 1890 article, technology has been a key player.10 
Despite that thread of connection to the past, there can be no 
doubt that we live in very different times than Warren and 
Brandeis and confront more dramatic consequences for privacy as 
a result of modern technologies.11  Whereas Warren and Brandeis 
feared the impact of film cameras taking still images on privacy,12 
we live in a world populated by closed-circuit television networks, 
high-resolution spy satellites, surveillance drones, and Global 
                                                 
social control); Julian Ryall, North Korea Steps Up Surveillance of Citizens with 
16,000 CCTV Cameras, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9801850/North-Ko
rea-steps-up-surveillance-of-citizens-with-16000-CCTV-cameras.html 
(reporting that North Korea now has over 101,000 cameras with which to 
“tighten[] its control on the lives of the people”). 
10 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (explaining that recent inventions call attention to the next 
step to be taken for the protection of the person and the right to be let alone). 
11 See Christopher Slobogin, An Original Take on Originalism, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 14, 19 (2011) (explaining “that in many areas relevant to search and 
seizure we do not have a good historical account” and that many cases “do not 
have analogues, even tenuous ones,” such as “special needs cases, involving a 
wide range of regulatory intrusions such as drug testing and searches of students 
and employees, roadblocks set up to detect illegal immigrants, and anti-terrorist 
checkpoints at airports, subways, ferries, and dams” which “raise the most 
contentious and important Fourth Amendment issues courts are addressing 
today”). 
12 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.’ ”). 
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Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking technology. 13   In the late 
nineteenth century, what personal information was collected 
appeared in the paper files of isolated agencies and corporations.14  
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, agencies and 
corporations can access nearly infinite storage capacity, integrated 
data systems, powerful data aggregation technologies, and 
increasingly sophisticated data mining tools. 15   With this 
dramatically enhanced capacity to aggregate, store, and share 
information comes corresponding threats to privacy. 
In themselves, and in the aggregate, technological advances 
have made it possible for public and private actors to watch us and 
to know us in ways that once seemed like science fiction.  Take, 
for example, the “Virtual Alabama” project, a collaboration 
between Alabama and Google. 16   Virtual Alabama is a data 
                                                 
13 See Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Public Area CCTV and 
Crime Prevention:  An Updated Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 26 JUST. 
Q. 716, 717 (2009); Siobhan Gorman, Satellite-Surveillance Program To Begin 
Despite Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122282336428992785.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Ryan J. Reilly, 
FBI GPS Tracking Memos Kept Mostly Secret by Justice Department, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/16/
fbi-gps-tracking-memos_n_2488180.html; Andrea Stone, Drone Program Aims 
To ‘Accelerate’ Use of Unmanned Aircraft by Police, HUFFINGTON POST (May 
22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/drones-dhs-program-
unmanned-aircraft-police_n_1537074.html. 
14 See ENGAGING PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL 
AGE 357 (James Waldo et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the majority of record-
keeping in the late 19th century was local and therefore limited in its ability to 
control individuals); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger:  The 
Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 246 n.11 (2006) (citing ELTING E. MORISON, MEN, 
MACHINES, AND MODERN TIME 54 (1966)); see, e.g., Early Census Processing 
and the Seaton Device, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/
www/innovations/technology/early_census_processing_and_the_seaton_device.
html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (describing the laborious and time-consuming 
process of hand-processing census information). 
15 See Citron, supra note 14, at 247 (chronicling the rapid evolution of data 
collection and data processing). 
16 See Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among 
State and Federal Agencies, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 13, 2009), 
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aggregation system that combines three-dimensional satellite and 
aerial imagery, geospatial analytics, feeds from traffic cameras, 
private and public video systems (including feeds from one 
thousand five hundred schools), GPS location data, sex offender 
registries, hospital inventories, and land-ownership records, 
including assessments.17 At present, the ever-expanding scope and 
reach of this technology is unchecked by constitution or statute, 
suggesting that Big Brother18 is closer than we might think. 
Governments are not the only ones using modern surveillance 
and data aggregation technologies to track and monitor our 
activities.  Vast reservoirs of our private data are gathered by or 
otherwise reside in the hands of private entities.19  GPS chips in our 
telephones, cars, and computers share a steady stream of locational 
information with companies providing services associated with 
these devices.20  Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) log our online 
movements using “Deep-Packet Inspection.” 21   Credit card 
companies and behavioral advertisers record and analyze our 
shopping habits, online and offline. 22   In one apocryphal case 
revealed in 2012, Target used information drawn from its internal 
                                                 
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Virtual-Alabama-Facilitates-Data-
Sharing-Among.html.  
17 See id. 
18 See ORWELL, supra note 9. 
19 See Citron, supra note 14, at 248; Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most 
of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society:  A Statutory Implementation 
of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24–25 (2012) 
(responding to Professor Kerr’s criticism of the difficult questions raised by 
mosaic theory). 
20 See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:  
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 677, 679 (2011). 
21  See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet 
Inspection, in OFFICE OF PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., DEEP PACKET 
INSPECTION ESSAY PROJECT (2009), available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/
information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp  
22  See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/
magazine/shoppinghabits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (recounting how Target 
uses publicly available databases and market analytics to identify women who 
are in the early stages of pregnancy). 
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and exogenous databases to identify newly pregnant women who, 
they believed, would be particularly amenable to direct marketing 
of products for new mothers and their infants.23  Target and other 
retailers also use ever more sophisticated behavioral and even 
neurological analytics in order to drive sales.24 
As these new surveillance technologies have migrated from 
science fiction to reality over the last several decades, privacy 
scholars have updated and expanded upon Warren and Brandeis’s 
warnings. 25   Principal among their concerns are the effects of 
continuous, indiscriminate, and often invasive surveillance on our 
abilities to pursue and enjoy basic liberties. 26  Privacy scholars 
have documented the risks and realities of abuse by those who 
acquire and hold substantial quantities of personal data.27  As our 
lives have become increasingly dependent on data reservoirs, they 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. 
REV. 1805, 1831–32 (2010) (proposing “potential strategies for ensuring privacy 
tort law’s efficacy in the information age” that build upon the theories of Warren 
and Brandeis); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight:  A Farewell 
to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362–63 
(1983) (arguing that, as technological intrusions become more prevalent, privacy 
law should focus on the source of the information, rather than whether it is 
exposed to the public).  
26 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:  LAW, 
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, 
Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 195 (2008); 
Freiwald, supra note 20, at 679; Susan Freiwald, First Principles of 
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 837 (2000); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 905, 931–39 (2009); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:  Personal 
Information and the Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. 
REV. 553, 560–61 (1995). 
27 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44–47 (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 33 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling 
Government’s 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 822 (2010); Citron, supra note 25, at 1805; Citron, supra note 14. 
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have warned us about the dangers of error and misinformation.28  
Despite these calls for concern, however, courts mostly have 
stayed out of the fray.29  The political branches have likewise left 
the expansion of surveillance technologies largely unchecked, save 
for a few reactionary pieces of legislation addressing a narrow 
range of concerns such as banking and telephone records.30 
All of this seems about to change.  On January 23, 2012, in 
United States v. Jones, 31  the U.S. Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to decide whether the Fourth Amendment might 
impose some restraint on the use of modern surveillance 
technologies by law enforcement officers and their private-sector 
                                                 
28 See Citron, supra note 25. 
29 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  
A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2010) (describing case law 
on Internet communication, surveillance and data breaches as “sparse”).  But see 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989) (prohibiting the disclosure of FBI rap sheets to third parties under FOIA); 
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971) (limiting the dissemination 
of arrest records). 
30 See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984) (“In 
1978, in response to this Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, . . . 
Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act . . . . That statute accords 
customers of banks and similar financial institutions certain rights to be notified 
of and to challenge in court administrative subpoenas of financial records in the 
possession of the banks.”); M. Todd Heflin, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf:  
Why the Fear of Carnivore Is an Irrational Product of the Digital Age, 107 
DICK. L. REV. 343, 352 (2002) (“Partially in response to the Court’s decision in 
Katz, Congress codified Fourth Amendment principles, as applied to oral and 
written communications, in Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 . . . .”); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of 
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 857–58 (2002) (describing the 
controversial confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court 
nomination leading up to Congress’s passage of the Video Privacy Protection 
Act of 1988); Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age:  
The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1321, 1322–23 n.5 
(2004) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Maryland—that 
the use of pen registers to record telephone numbers did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment—led to Congress passing limited regulations on government use of 
the technology and citing to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986). 
31 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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proxies.  Although the Court demurred for the time being, a 
majority of the sitting Justices expressed sympathy for what has 
come to be known as the “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment 
privacy.32  The fundamental insight behind the mosaic theory is 
that we can maintain reasonable expectations of Fourth 
Amendment privacy in certain quantities of information and data 
even if we lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
constituent parts of that whole.33 
This Article examines and explores the mosaic theory.  
Although the debate is in its early stages, the mosaic theory 
exposes an important, but heretofore underappreciated, quantitative 
dimension of Fourth Amendment privacy. 34   Nevertheless, the 
proposals made so far to convert that insight into a set of workable 
rules and principles are unconvincing.  Part II provides a detailed 
exegesis of the mosaic theory by reviewing Jones and its 
predecessor litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit.  Part III reviews and expands upon the major 
conceptual, doctrinal, and practical objections that have been 
raised in the literature.  Part IV deepens the discussion by 
exploring responses that mosaic advocates might make in defense 
of their theory.  Part V concludes that, for the mosaic theory to be a 
serious response to the disconcerting encroachment of modern 
surveillance technologies on our reasonable expectations of 
privacy, its proponents must develop a practical means of 
implementation.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, 
                                                 
32 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 3–4; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012). 
33 See Ryan Calo, Don’t Let Privacy Go To The Dogs:  A Proposal To Wait 
On Jardines, USVJONES.COM (June 2, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/
dont-let-privacy-go-to-the-dogs-a-proposal-to-wait-on-jardines/ (implying that 
the mosaic theory does not address the use of drones for dragnet surveillance); 
Woodrow Hartzog, United States v. Jones and the Need to Embrace Obscurity, 
USVJONES.COM (June 2, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/united-states-v-
jones-and-the-need-to-embrace-obscurity/ (concluding that the mosaic theory 
supports an obscurity-based analysis of privacy). 
34 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in 
part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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the authors argue elsewhere that any such proposal must focus on 
the technologies.35 
II.  THE MOSAIC THEORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
Although privacy scholars have been beating a steady drum 
against the threats of broad and indiscriminate surveillance posed 
by contemporary advancements in surveillance technology, there 
has been relatively little resistance from legislatures and courts.36  
To be sure, there are some exceptions.  Public discomfort with the 
unprecedented data mining and data sharing “Total Information 
Awareness” system under development at the Department of 
Defense in the late 1990s and early 2000s37 resulted in Congress’s 
cutting funding in 2004.38  But that system has resurfaced in other 
governmental surveillance programs, just with different names, 
like “fusion centers.” 39   Congress recently expressed concerns 
about fusion centers, which are cooperative data gathering, 
aggregation, and analysis ventures among local, state, and federal 
agencies in collaboration with private-sector allies,40 but has yet to 
suggest any serious plans to regulate the use of these or any other 
                                                 
35 See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
36 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
37 See John Markoff, Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/13/us/chief-
takes-over-at-agency-thwart-attacks-on-us.html; Jeffrey Rosen, Total 
Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/12/15/magazine/15TOTA.html; William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/opinion/you-are-a-
suspect.html.  
38 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, 
§ 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003). 
39 See U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL 
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 1 
(2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/fusion.pdf. 
40  See id. (“The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned 
detailees to the fusion centers forwarded ‘intelligence’ of uneven quality—often 
times shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and 
Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public 
sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.”). 
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surveillance technologies.41  In the face of persistent inaction by 
the legislature, courts have begun to step into the breach.42  In this 
transformative environment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in United States v. Jones.43 
In 2004, a joint task force of federal and local law enforcement 
in Washington, D.C. began investigating a narcotics conspiracy 
that included Lawrence Maynard and Antoine Jones.44  During the 
course of their investigation, officers sought and received warrants 
that allowed them to tap Maynard’s and Jones’s phones and to 
attach and monitor a GPS-enabled tracking device 45  to Jones’s 
automobile.46  The GPS warrant required that the officers install 
                                                 
41  Both Democrat- and Republican-sponsored bills attempting to regulate 
surveillance died in committee last session.  See, e.g., Preserving Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287, 112th Cong. (2012), available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3287/text; Protecting America’s 
Privacy Act of 2012, S. 3515, 112th Cong. (2012), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3515/text (limiting the overseas 
acquisition of information about a persons believed to be in the United States).  
But see Natasha Singer, Their Apps Track You. Will Congress Track Them?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/technology/
legislation-would-regulate-tracking-of-cellphone-users.html?_r=0 (reporting on 
Senator Al Franken’s continued effort to regulate the use of tracking technology 
in cell phones);  cf. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, 112th 
Cong. (2012), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/
HEN12877-Franken-Sub.pdf. (proposing controls on government and private 
access to locational data acquired through cellular phones and GPS devices). 
42  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
43 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
44 Id. at 948 (majority opinion); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
45 See Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and 
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411–13 (2007) (explaining 
GPS-enabled tracking technology). 
46 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  The vehicle in question was registered to Jones’s 
wife, but the Government conceded, and the district court found, that Jones had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Jeep.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555–56 
n.*.  The Supreme Court later held that Jones also had a property interest in the 
Jeep.  Jones 132 S. Ct. at 948.  All courts therefore referred to the Jeep as 
“Jones’s.” 
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the device within ten days and within the District of Columbia.47  
Unfortunately, officers violated both of these terms, installing the 
device a day late and while Jones’s vehicle was parked in a 
suburban Maryland parking lot. 48   They nevertheless used the 
device to track Jones for twenty-eight days, during which time they 
collected over two thousand pages of tracking data.49 
Based on the officers’ failure to abide the terms of their 
warrant, Jones moved at trial to suppress all evidence discovered 
by or through the GPS device.50  The trial court, relying on United 
States v. Knotts,51 denied his motion.52  In Knotts, the United States 
Supreme Court held that using a radio beeper device to track a 
defendant over the course of an afternoon did not violate the 
subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy because he had 
knowingly exposed himself to public observation.53  Therefore, the 
beeper tracking was “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the 
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”54  The trial judge in 
Jones’s case saw no distinction between surveillance conducted 
using GPS and surveillance conducted using a beeper device 
because, in both cases, the technology revealed nothing more to 
officers than what the subjects had knowingly exposed to the 
public:  their movements along public roads. 55   Although the 
officers in Jones violated the terms of their warrant, the trial court 
found that they were not required to get a warrant in the first place, 
and therefore did not violate Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.56 
Based in part on evidence produced using the GPS-enabled 
tracking device, Jones was convicted. 57  On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
                                                 
47 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
52 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
53 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–85. 
54 Id. at 285. 
55 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 949. 
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reversed.58  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Ginsburg held 
that Knotts did not control.59  Knotts, he wrote, “held only that ‘a 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another,’ not that such a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world 
without end.”60  Furthermore, he argued, there is a constitutionally 
significant difference between being tracked and monitored for an 
afternoon and being tracked and monitored twenty-four hours a 
day for four weeks.61  The constitutional line, according to Judge 
Ginsburg’s opinion, is marked by reasonable expectations of 
privacy.62 
We knowingly expose ourselves to public observation 
whenever we leave the house.  We must therefore expect that we 
will sometimes be observed during the course of our daily lives.  
According to Judge Ginsburg, however, the same cannot be said of 
our public movements in the aggregate.63  Quite to the contrary, we 
reasonably expect that we are not being watched constantly. 64   
Thus, according to Judge Ginsburg’s panel, constant and sustained 
government surveillance constitutes a “search” for Fourth 
                                                 
58 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
59 Id. at 556. 
60 Id. at 557. 
61 Id. at 556–57. 
62 Id. at 557. 
63 Id. at 558; see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone 
to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his 
origin, route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; 
rather, he expects, each of those movements to remain ‘disconnected and 
anonymous.’ ”). 
64  In an analogous way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have 
reinforced the notion that people can expect to be free from unreasonable 
surveillance.  See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(upholding an injunction against a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 
F. Supp. 1413, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a family on 
the grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment and 
unreasonable surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public place”). 
SPRING 2013] A Shattered Looking Glass 395 
Amendment purposes. 65   Because Jones had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a 
month . . . , and the use of the GPS device to monitor those 
movements defeated that reasonable expectation,”66 the officers in 
Jones were obliged to submit themselves to Fourth Amendment 
constraints.67  By violating the terms of their warrant, they failed in 
that duty. 68   The circuit court therefore vacated Jones’s 
conviction.69 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 70   
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the officers’ 
installation of the GPS device was a search because it was 
accomplished by a trespass and for the purpose of obtaining 
information.71  According to Justice Scalia, “We have no doubt that 
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
adopted.”72  Because the officers violated the terms of their warrant 
when installing the device, they violated Jones’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.73  All subsequent monitoring of the device was 
                                                 
65 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 567 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–
63 (1979)). 
66 Id. at 563. 
67 See id. at 566–68. 
68 Id. 
69  According to its decretal paragraph, the court “reversed” Jones’s 
conviction, but one assumes that the court intended to leave open the possibility 
of a retrial if the Government chose to go forward without evidence obtained by 
the GPS-enabled monitoring.  See, e.g., id. at 568 (“To be sure, absent the GPS 
data a jury reasonably might have inferred Jones was involved in the 
conspiracy.”). 
70 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
71 Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hen the government does engage in a physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
72 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
73 See id. at 949, 954 (citing Maynard, 615 F.3d 544) (affirming the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that “reversed the conviction 
because of admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS 
device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amendment”).  Judge Kavanaugh 
proposed trespass as a narrower ground for the decision in his dissent from the 
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a fruit of this initial violation, so Justice Scalia saw no need to 
address the broader question of whether using the device to track 
Jones might constitute a separate and independent Fourth 
Amendment search.74 
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Justice Alito 
concurred.75  After expressing considerable skepticism about the 
majority’s trespass rule, Justice Alito focused his attention on 
defending the basic premises of the quantitative theory of Fourth 
Amendment privacy upon which Judge Ginsburg relied in the 
court below.76  For Justice Alito, the central Fourth Amendment 
issues presented to the Court by the facts in Jones arose from the 
use of new surveillance technologies.  “In the pre-computer age,” 
he wrote, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” 77   It was simply 
impossible for law enforcement to conduct continuous surveillance 
of a suspect for four weeks using only traditional techniques.78  As 
a consequence of these practical limitations, Justice Alito echoed 
the circuit court’s point that we have good reason to believe that 
we are not subject to constant surveillance.79  Although “short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as 
reasonable,” Justice Alito wrote, “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
                                                 
circuit court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.  See United States v. 
Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
74 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
75 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
76 Id. 
77 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 963–64; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (“A 
reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of 
every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each 
place he stops and how long he stays there . . . .”); see also Hutchins, supra note 
45, 455–56. 
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privacy.” 80   Despite joining the majority opinion, Justice 
Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in Jones to express broad 
sympathy with Justice Alito’s quantitative approach to assessing 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.81 
The general theory of Fourth Amendment privacy advanced by 
Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Judge Ginsburg in these 
opinions has been described as the mosaic theory.82  Although its 
various proponents differ in the details, the core insight that drives 
the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy is that we can 
maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in certain quantities of 
information and data even if we lack reasonable expectations of 
privacy in the constituent parts of those wholes.83  Although it was 
not adopted in Jones, there appear to be five votes on the Court for 
adopting some version of the mosaic theory.84  As a consequence, 
in the months after Jones there has been a rush of commentary on 
the conceptual, doctrinal, and practical viability of the mosaic 
theory.85  The remainder of this Article will review and add to this 
                                                 
80 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephen 
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine 
of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005) 
(describing the direct relationship between privacy expectations and factors such 
as duration of travel and route complexity). 
81 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
82 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Kerr, supra note 32, at 311.  Justice Alito 
does not adopt the phrase “mosaic theory,” but neither does he indicate any 
point of disagreement with Judge Ginsburg’s basic mosaic framework.  See 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64.  The term “mosaic” is borrowed from national 
security law, where the Government has defended against requests made under 
the Freedom of Information Act on the grounds that when otherwise innocuous 
information is aggregated it can reveal secret methods and sources.  See 
generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the 
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005). 
83 See Daniel Solove, United States v. Jones and the Future of Privacy Law:  
The Potential Far-Reaching Implications of the GPS Surveillance Case, 
USVJONES.COM (June 1, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/01/the-potential-
far-reaching-implications-of-the-gps-surveillance-case/#more-146 (approving of 
the mosaic theory’s expansion of privacy). 
84 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, 
J., concurring in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan). 
85 See infra Parts III & IV. 
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debate, beginning with an overview of the main challenges brought 
by critics and skeptics of the mosaic theory. 
III.  THE MOSAIC THEORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In the months after Maynard and Jones, the mosaic theory has 
been subject to considerable criticism both inside and outside the 
courts.  Most of these objections fall into one of three categories:  
conceptual, doctrinal, and practical.  This Part describes the most 
prominent and compelling objections in each of these categories 
and contributes a few more along the way.  The conversation in 
subsequent Parts considers some responses that have been 
advanced by defenders of the mosaic theory, proposes a few more, 
and concludes that the mosaic theory cannot be dismissed 
prematurely, but that proponents bear the considerable burden of 
addressing practical concerns. 
A. Conceptual Objections to the Mosaic Theory 
Critics have met the mosaic theory with a basic arithmetical 
challenge that inheres in the mosaic approach itself.  The mosaic 
theory is not needed to protect information that is already secured 
behind the veil of reasonable expectations of privacy.  The mosaic 
theory is needed, and is therefore salient, only when the conduct or 
information at issue does not, when considered discretely, 
implicate reasonable expectations of privacy.  The mosaic theory 
holds that, in some cases, certain quanta of data, or perhaps certain 
quanta of certain kinds of data,86 implicate reasonable expectations 
of privacy even though the constituent parts do not.87  So framed, 
                                                 
86 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (criticizing Justice Alito’s suggestion that 
seriousness of the target crime might be a factor in assessing the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of informational mosaics).  As we argue elsewhere, there 
are good doctrinal grounds for courts to include the seriousness of suspected 
criminal conduct when conducting the balancing of interests that Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness demands.  See infra notes 75–83 and accompanying 
text. 
87 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.  
The Maynard opinion recounts several compelling examples: 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by 
any single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these places over the 
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the mosaic theory seems to violate basic rules of arithmetic. 88   
Judge Sentelle perhaps put it best in his dissent from the D.C. 
Circuit’s denial of the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc 
in Jones when he pointed out that “[t]he sum of an infinite number 
of zero-value parts is also zero.”89  Although a bit punchy in the 
presentation, the conceptual issue is clear enough. 
The problem that Judge Sentelle identifies is not merely 
mathematical.  It also highlights the mosaic theory’s apparent 
absence of Fourth Amendment pedigree and its potential tensions 
with mainstays of Fourth Amendment doctrine and analysis.  For 
example, most searches are the result of what might be described 
as evolving encounters.  That is, officers develop reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause through a series of investigative steps 
and interactions with suspects.90  As Orin Kerr has pointed out, the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has always taken a 
synchronic rather than diachronic approach when evaluating the 
reasonableness of law enforcement conduct during these evolving 
encounters.91  The Court’s recent decision in Kentucky v. King92 
provides a ready example. 
                                                 
course of a month.  The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but 
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a 
different story. 
Id. at 562. 
88 An additive mathematical identity, in this case zero, does not change the 
number to which it is added.  Additive Identity, MERRIAM WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/additive%20
identity (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
89 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle J., 
dissenting); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (“The concurrence posits that 
‘relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets’ is 
okay, but that ‘the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most 
offenses’ is not good.  That introduces yet another novelty into our 
jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). 
90 One court explained “evolving encounters” as a situation “where new facts 
continually emerge . . . justifying police action that only moments before would 
have been unlawful.”  People v. Sloup, 834 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Ill. App. 2005). 
91 Kerr, supra note 32, at 314–19, 337. 
92 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
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In King, police officers followed a suspect, who had just 
purchased crack cocaine from an undercover agent, into an 
apartment building.93  As they entered the building’s breezeway, 
they heard a door close, but could not discern which of two 
apartments the suspect had entered.94  The officers had no reason to 
think that the suspect knew he was being followed, so they had no 
claim of hot pursuit or any other emergency at that point.95  They 
did, however, detect the smell of burning marijuana emanating 
from behind one door, so they decided to knock, announce 
themselves, and request entry. 96   The predictable ensued.  
Immediately after announcing their presence, the officers heard 
noises inside the apartment that might reasonably have indicated 
that evidence was being destroyed.97  Based on that suspicion, the 
officers forced the door open and entered the apartment.98  Once 
inside, the officers seized several people on the scene, conducted a 
Buie 99 protective sweep, and in the course of that search found 
marijuana, cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and cash in plain view.100  
As it turned out, the initial suspect was not in the apartment, but 
three other people were, including the eventual respondent:  Hollis 
King.101 
King was convicted on several narcotics charges and appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.102  Although skeptical that the 
sounds officers heard coming from the apartment were enough to 
justify an unwarranted entry under the emergency exception to the 
                                                 
93 Id. at 1854. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99  Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335–36 (1990) (“The sweep lasts no 
longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger [to the 
officers] and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and 
depart the premises.”). 
100 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1855. 
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warrant clause, the Kentucky court assumed as much. 103   It 
nevertheless held that King’s conviction should be vacated because 
the officers created the emergency.104  In that court’s view, it was 
unreasonable from a Fourth Amendment perspective for officers to 
knock on the apartment door because it was foreseeable, given the 
circumstances, that doing so would create an emergency.105  The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 106   In doing so, it rejected 
approaches adopted in lower courts that required assessing the 
reasonableness of law enforcement conduct holistically by looking 
at the totality of an evolving encounter that eventually resulted in a 
search or arrest. 107   The Court instead recommitted itself to 
assessing the reasonableness of officer conduct at each step of an 
encounter. 108   The Court therefore held that all the Fourth 
Amendment requires is that, at each stage of an evolving 
investigation or engagement, officers limit themselves to conduct 
that is reasonable based on what they know or observe.109  In so 
holding, the Court reaffirmed its longstanding commitment110 to an 
objective and synchronic assessment of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. 
The mosaic theory raises serious concerns when considered in 
the light of cases like King.  Beyond the mathematical challenge of 
adding nothings to get something, the very idea of an additive or 
holistic approach to evaluating Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
runs contrary to the synchronic approach that is a foundation of 
long-standing Fourth Amendment analysis. 
  
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1864. 
107 Id. at 1858–61 (describing and rejecting tests based on assessments of “bad 
faith” and reasonable foreseeability that law enforcement conduct leading to an 
emergency). 
108 Id. at 1863–64. 
109 Id. 
110  See Kerr, supra note 32, 320–43 (explaining the development and 
application of the synchronic approach to Fourth Amendment cases). 
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B. Doctrinal Objections to the Mosaic Theory 
The mosaic theory endorsed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia and a majority of concurring Justices in 
United States v. Jones proposes nothing short of a revolution in 
Fourth Amendment law.  Never before has the Court suggested 
that we can have reasonable expectations of privacy in certain 
quantities or aggregations of information even if we have no such 
expectations in the constituent parts. 111   As with any doctrinal 
revolution, the mosaic theory appears to require some blood on the 
floor.  Specifically, adopting a mosaic approach to the Fourth 
Amendment may require abandoning or dramatically altering two 
important lines of Fourth Amendment law:  the public observation 
doctrine112 and the third party doctrine.113  To the extent that this is 
so, commitments to these doctrines, or simply to stare decisis, 
counsel caution before adopting a mosaic theory of Fourth 
Amendment privacy. 
Adopting a mosaic approach to quantitative privacy seems to 
require abandoning the public observation doctrine, which is often 
credited to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Knotts.114  In Knotts, the Court held that using a beeper device to 
track a suspect’s car on public streets did not constitute a “search” 
because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
                                                 
111 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
112 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling in public 
places). 
113  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court 
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (citing the Government’s argument 
that the mosaic theory as applied to surveillance will hamper police 
investigations). 
114 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“This Court has to date not deviated from the 
understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”); see 
also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”). 
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his public movements.115  Although the beeper allowed officers to 
follow Knotts more efficiently and with fewer personnel, the 
Knotts Court specifically declined to hold that using technology 
raises any independent Fourth Amendment concerns simply 
because it makes it easier for law enforcement officers to conduct 
surveillance that they are otherwise entitled to do using traditional 
means.116   
The parallels between Knotts and Jones are obvious.  In both 
cases, law enforcement officers used a passive signaling device 
attached to a car. 117   In both cases, the devices revealed only 
movements on public streets.118  In both cases, those movements 
were exposed to public view.119  Given these similarities, Knotts 
would seem to control in a case like Jones, thus barring Fourth 
Amendment review of GPS-enabled tracking so long as the 
technology is only used to monitor movements in public.120  Should 
the Court eventually adopt a mosaic approach to assessing and 
protecting quantitative privacy, it would therefore seem obliged to 
overrule or modify Knotts and the long line of subsequent cases121 
endorsing investigative-surveillance techniques and technologies 
                                                 
115 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
116 Id. at 284–85. 
117 Id. at 277 (“A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which 
emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”); Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 947 (“By means of signals from multiple satellites, the [GPS] device 
established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that 
location by cellular phone to a Government computer.”). 
118 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
119 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
120 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting); id. at 769–70 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
121 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1998) (holding that anything 
visible at four hundred feet in the air is open to public view); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that garbage cans left out for 
collection is open to public rummaging); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986) (holding that anything visible from public airspace is open to public 
view). 
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that merely document what targets knowingly expose to public 
view.122 
Among the most compelling examples of these potential 
disruptions is the effect of the mosaic theory on traditional human 
surveillance.123  Visual surveillance is a mainstay of targeted police 
investigations.  Police officers routinely conduct “stake-outs,” 
sometimes using teams of officers and vehicles to track suspects as 
they move through public spaces.124  Law enforcement agencies 
also aggregate information from informants to develop detailed 
accounts of suspects’ public movements.125  These practices are not 
only commonplace,126 they have been routinely endorsed by courts 
                                                 
122 Jones, 625 F.3d at 769 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere in Knotts or 
any other Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decision since the adoption of the 
expectation of privacy rationale in Katz has the Court ever suggested that the 
test of the reasonable expectation is in any way related to the intent of the user 
of the data obtained by the surveillance or other alleged search.”). 
123 Id. at 769 (“Therefore, it would appear, as appellee argues, that this novel 
aggregation approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy would prohibit 
not only GPS-augmented surveillance, but any other police surveillance of 
sufficient length to support consolidation of data into the sort of pattern or 
mosaic contemplated by the panel. . . . I cannot discern any distinction.”); Kerr, 
supra note 32, at 335 (“If the police send a team of investigators to place the 
suspect under visual surveillance, should that visual surveillance be subject to 
the same [mosaic] analysis?”). 
124 See LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179 
(Anderson Publishing, 7th ed. 2012) (“The bulk of surveillance conducted by 
police agencies is physical surveillance.”); Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, 
THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/
09/03/120903fa_fact_stillman#ixzz2J3ZyPWC7 (“By some estimates, up to 
eighty per cent of all drug cases in America involve [informants]”); see sources 
cited supra note 126 and accompanying text.; cf. 3 COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL WELFARE 228–29 (Karen M. Sowers et al. eds., 
2008) (concluding that the use of multiple informants is “the most effective 
strategy . . . to gather assessment data about a child”). 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 60 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding 
that the combined information of three confidential informants along with other 
surveillance was sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the 
home of a suspected drug dealer); see also State v. McCain, 713 S.E.2d 21, 28 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that multiple “informants, citizens and 
anonymous callers” provided enough probable cause for a search warrant). 
126 See sources cited supra note 124. 
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as well within Fourth Amendment bounds127—a view that is shared 
even among mosaic promoters128—because they document conduct 
and movements in which the suspect or target has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.129  The mosaic theory puts these practices 
and the line of doctrine endorsing them in obvious jeopardy, 
particularly when officers are too successful and their 
investigations produce too much information.130  How, after all, are 
we to distinguish “between the supposed invasion by aggregation 
of data between the GPS-augmented surveillance and a purely 
visual surveillance of substantial length”?131 
In addition to the public observation doctrine, the mosaic 
theory also threatens to unsettle the “third party doctrine.”132  The 
Court has long held that citizens who share information with others 
assume the risk that what they share might be passed along to law 
enforcement.133  Applying this rule, the Court has held that there is 
no Fourth Amendment violation if a criminal confederate shares 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 125. 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on 
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.”). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (“Surveillance that reveals only what is 
already exposed to the public—such as a person’s movements during a single 
journey—is not a search.”) (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 
(1983)). 
130 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
131 Id.  As we shall see below, one important mosaic defender resolves this 
apparent tension by submitting all surveillance, whether manual or 
technologically-enhanced, to the same time constraints.  See infra Part IV.C. 
132 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 526 
(2006) (“This doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by 
third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”). 
133 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[A citizen] takes 
the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed 
by that person to the Government . . . even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” (citations omitted)). 
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the confidences of his co-conspirators with police, 134  if a bank 
shares a customer’s financial records with law enforcement,135 or if 
a telephone company discloses records of phone calls customers 
make or receive.136  More recently, a New York court ruled that a 
customer of the social networking website Twitter 137  had no 
standing to challenge a lawful subpoena issued against the 
company for locational information embedded in his posts because 
he voluntarily shared that information with Twitter.138 
As Justice Sotomayor, who expresses sympathy for some 
version of the mosaic theory in her Jones concurrence, points out, 
“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.”139  That is because we routinely share 
vast quantities of data with private agents, many of whom store 
it.140  Our Internet service providers track and keep detailed records 
of where we go on the internet. 141  Our chosen search engines 
                                                 
134 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 299–302 (1966) (holding that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation of privacy when a co-conspirator told 
police about plans to bribe jury members). 
135 Cal. Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67–69 (1974).  Congress 
responded to decisions like Miller and Shultz by passing the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006), which provides bank 
customers some privacy regarding their records held by banks and other 
financial institutions and stipulates procedures whereby federal agencies can 
gain access to those records. 
136 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that a person who 
uses a phone “assume[s] the risk that the [telephone] company [will] reveal to 
the police the numbers he dialed”).  The Pen Register Act attempted to fill the 
void left by Smith v. Maryland by requiring a court order to use a pen register or 
trap and trace device.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
§ 301(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2001); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE 
DIGITAL PERSON 205 (2004) (“Whereas a pen register records the telephone 
numbers a person dials from her home, a trap and trace device creates a list of 
the telephone numbers of incoming calls.”). 
137 TWITTER, https://twitter.com. (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
138 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507–10 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
139  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
140 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 7; Citron, supra note 14. 
141 See Citron, supra note 21.  
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gather information not only on our search patterns, but also where 
we go, what we look at, and what stimuli we react to while 
online. 142  For most of us, law enforcement would not need to 
install GPS-enabled devices on our persons or cars if they wanted 
to track us in the same way that officers tracked the defendants in 
Jones because we already carry GPS chips in our telephones, cars, 
and computers that pass along information about our movements to 
a wide range of third parties, from map services to social network 
applications and restaurant rating sites.143  Moreover, these third 
parties are already in the habit of sharing much of the information 
they gather.  Data brokers aggregate and analyze vast reservoirs of 
data from financial institutions, retailers, public records, social 
networking sites, and just about anywhere we interact with the 
physical or virtual worlds.144  The third party doctrine provides the 
Government with unfettered access to all of this data145—so much 
so that Chris Hoofnagle has coined the phrase “Big Brother’s Little 
Helpers” to describe data brokers like Acxiom,146 which aggregate 
data from public and third-party sources to compile detailed 
mosaics of information on anyone and everyone.147  
As Justice Alito suggested in his Jones concurrence, most of 
this information sharing is motivated by an interest in 
                                                 
142 See Declan McCullagh, FAQ:  Protecting Yourself from Search Engines, 
CNET (Aug. 8, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/FAQ-Protecting-yourself-from-
search-engines/2100-1025_3-6103486.html. 
143 See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe:  The Fourth Amendment 
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
489, 493, 528 (2012) (“Precise, persistent cell phone tracking also provides 
considerably more information:  it reveals a person’s location at all times, not 
just when he or she is driving.”). 
144  See generally U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER 
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (explaining the 
Commission’s recommendations to companies for increased consumer privacy). 
145 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for 
the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1451 (2011). 
146 ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
147 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers:  How ChoicePoint 
and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law 
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595 (2004). 
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convenience.148  We readily embrace “[n]ew technolog[ies] [that] 
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of 
privacy.”149  Having done so, the third party doctrine instructs us 
that there is no violation of reasonable expectations of privacy if 
the Government gains access to personal information through those 
with whom we have shared it.  Proponents of the mosaic approach 
to quantitative privacy resist this result, but in doing so appear 
obliged to modify or overturn the third party doctrine. 150  This 
would not only mean a break with long-established doctrine, but 
would also throw into doubt a wide range of common investigative 
techniques, notably the use of confidential informants, accessing 
credit histories, and confirming residential histories. 
C. Practical Concerns with the Mosaic Theory 
Many of the conceptual and doctrinal issues outlined in the 
foregoing sections lead to serious practical concerns that critics on 
and off the courts have argued should urge us to caution before 
adopting the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.  The 
most crucial is that translating the mosaic theory into practice will 
mean drawing important lines between aggregations of information 
that trigger reasonable expectations of privacy and those that do 
not.151  Justice Scalia identifies the challenges in Jones.  As he puts 
the point, mosaic advocates are on the hook for a coherent, 
practical, and doctrinally acceptable test that explains why short-
term monitoring is allowed but “a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ 
too long.”152  In an early commentary on Jones, Orin Kerr echoed 
Justice Scalia’s concerns, asking, “How long must the tool be used 
                                                 
148 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
149 Id. 
150 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 19, at 16–17; cf. Kerr, supra note 32, at 332 
(using third-party data collection to illustrate the difficulty in determining when 
the mosaic theory will apply to information gathering). 
151 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954; Kerr, supra note 32, at 330–31 (claiming that the 
mosaic theory lacks a clear standard). 
152 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.  For further discussion of Knotts, see supra notes 
51–56, 115–122, and accompanying text.  Gray & Citron, supra note 34, meets 
this challenge. 
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before the relevant mosaic is created?” 153  As Kerr has further 
pointed out, this line-drawing problem extends past mosaics 
constructed using a single investigative method, as was the case in 
Jones, 154  to include investigative portfolios aggregated using a 
variety of methods, perhaps including human surveillance.155 
There is no doubt that this line-drawing problem is serious.  
Among the most important burdens of any Fourth Amendment 
standard is that it must provide clear guidance to police officers 
and lower courts.156  Muddy and unpredictable tests are both unfair 
and ultimately fail to provide substantial protection. 157  From a 
more theoretical perspective, failure to provide fair warning may, 
as Lon Fuller has argued, constitute a failure to make law in the 
first place. 158   This failure to adequately make law ultimately 
compromises the goal of protecting rights.  After all, if law 
enforcement officers cannot predict with certainty whether 
investigative programs implicate the Fourth Amendment, then they 
are that much more likely to routinely, if unintentionally, violate 
                                                 
153 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 330–33. 
154 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946. 
155 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 334. 
156 See id. at 331–32 (explaining the uncertainty created under the mosaic 
theory as to when in the course of a surveillance a search occurs). 
157 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, 
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited 
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”); United States v. Jones, 
625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
mosaic theory does not produce predictable results); see, e.g., United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (declaring that searching an arrested person 
is reasonable under the 4th Amendment); see also Thornton v. United States, 
541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004) (“The need for a clear rule, readily understood by 
police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or 
were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort 
of generalization which Belton enunciated.”).  But see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 34 (1996) (reflecting that the Court has “consistently eschewed bright-
line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry”). 
158 See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–39 (2d ed. 1964). 
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the very reasonable expectations of privacy that the mosaic theory 
seeks to identify and protect.159 
Troublesome in their own right, these line-drawing problems 
also raise serious concerns that the mosaic theory would 
dramatically skew the balance of interests urged by the Fourth 
Amendment. 160   At base, Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
requires protecting both the legitimate interests of law enforcement 
officers and the privacy interests of citizens.161  As the Court has 
often indicated, providing officers with clear rules of conduct 
preserves this balance by erecting important privacy protections 
and by preserving adequate space for aggressive law 
enforcement.162  Some commentators have suggested that the very 
vagueness of the mosaic theory threatens to paralyze law 
enforcement officers in the midst of active investigations because 
they will be forced to worry constantly whether their efforts have 
been so successful that they have created a mosaic, implicating the 
Fourth Amendment.163 
Assuming that mosaic advocates can meet line drawing 
concerns, downstream issues of application remain.  For example, 
should investigations that could potentially create mosaics be 
bound by the warrant requirement, or will it be enough for officers 
to justify their conduct retrospectively? 164   If a warrant is not 
required, what level of suspicion is necessary to justify 
investigations that might generate mosaics? 165   Is reasonable 
suspicion sufficient, or is probable cause required?166  Should there 
be different standards for different investigative techniques or 
                                                 
159 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1468, 1468–69 (1985). 
160 Jones, 625 F.3d at 767–68 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
aggregation technique of the mosaic theory would impede previously acceptable 
police investigation techniques). 
161 See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213–14; cf. Slobogin, supra note 19, at 5. 
163 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 32, at 331–32, 347–50. 
164 Id. at 338. 
165 See id. 
166 Id. 
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mosaics of different form, nature, or dimension?167  Then there is 
the question of remedy.  As the Court has made clear, a Fourth 
Amendment violation does not determine the remedy.168  Should 
the exclusionary rule govern mosaic violations?169  If so, will it be 
effective given the likelihood that many mosaic violations will be 
the result of investigations pursued in good faith that are simply 
more successful retrospectively than law enforcement thought they 
would be ex ante?170  For its detractors, the mosaic theory simply 
creates too many questions and not enough answers to become a 
rule of force in Fourth Amendment law. 
IV.  DEFENDING THE MOSAIC THEORY 
Mosaic advocates have not been silent in the face of objections 
and concerns advanced by the theory’s critics.  To the contrary, 
they have both met the objections and developed concrete 
proposals meant to address many of these concerns.  This Part 
reviews some of those efforts, suggests other possible responses, 
and offers assessments of their success. 
A. Responding to Conceptual Objections 
Among the most nettlesome of conceptual objections to the 
mosaic theory is Judge Sentelle’s premise that “[t]he sum of an 
infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”171  If Knotts was 
correctly decided, and we do not have reasonable expectations of 
privacy in our public movements, then we cannot, by modus 
tollens and within the rules of arithmetic, have a reasonable 
                                                 
167 Id. at 338–39. 
168 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“For exclusion 
to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy 
costs.”); United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (“The fact that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the 
exclusionary rule applies.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)). 
169 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 340. 
170 Id. at 341. 
171 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
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expectation of privacy in any aggregated collection of our public 
movements.  
Mosaic advocates appear to respond that the critique 
misunderstands the point.  Reasonable expectations of privacy, 
they contend, are not theoretical. 172   Rather, they are practical 
assessments of common social practices and expectations.173  Thus, 
as Judge Ginsburg explains, it is both possible and likely that a 
“passerby” might “observe or even follow someone during a single 
journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.”174  
We are all familiar with such happenstances, and at one point or 
another have found ourselves driving the same roads with a fellow 
traveler for miles and hours, or perhaps even briefly following 
someone who looks vaguely familiar to determine whether they 
are, in fact, that person on whom we had a crush in the eighth 
grade.  By contrast, Judge Ginsburg points out, “the likelihood that 
a stranger would observe all [of ‘a person’s movements over the 
course of a month’] is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”175  Cast 
in this practical light, Judge Sentelle’s conceptual criticism seems 
to have little traction on the mosaic theory because the atomic-
molecular distinction between individual bits of data and large 
aggregations of data proposed by the mosaic theory is grounded in 
autoethnography176 and practical realities rather than ontology. 
                                                 
172 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559–60 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (citing Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (discussing practical social expectations regarding 
the touching and manipulation of bags on a passenger bus); Florida v. Riley, 488 
U.S. 445 (1998) (discussing practical social expectations regarding flight in 
public airspace); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (discussing 
practical social expectations regarding the contents of garbage cans left out for 
collection); and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing practical 
social expectations regarding flight in public airspace)). 
173 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559–560. 
174 Id. at 560. 
175 Id. 
176 Autoethnographic research focuses on “analyz[ing] personal experience in 
order to study cultural experience.”  Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams & Arthur 
Bochner, Autoethnography:  An Overview, 12 FORUM QUALITATIVE 
SOZIALFORSCHUNG / FORUM:  QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. 1 (2011). 
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Although tempting in some ways, this purely practical 
approach to defending the mosaic theory probably does not 
provide much of a safe harbor.  The reason why is evident from the 
Court’s holding in United States v. Kyllo.177  There, the Court was 
asked whether the use of a heat detection device “to explore details 
of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion” constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 178   
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that it did, in part because 
the device in question was “not in general public use.”179  The 
implication, of course, is that if heat detection devices became 
ubiquitous features of smartphone cameras, such that any member 
of the public could observe heat emanations from a home, then 
police officers would be entitled to do the same without 
implicating the Fourth Amendment.  There could no longer be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those emanations from a 
descriptive, ethnographic point of view if the technology were to 
become ubiquitous.   
Although heat detection devices remain relatively rare,180 the 
same is not true for GPS-enabled tracking devices or data 
aggregation technologies.  Quite to the contrary, GPS chips are in 
“general public use” in our cellular phones, cars, computers, and 
tablets.181  Private purchases of GPS-enabled tracking devices are 
also on the rise as the technology becomes cheaper and easier to 
use.182  As a consequence, for most of us, the aggregate of our daily 
                                                 
177 533 U.S. 26 (2001). 
178 Id. at 40. 
179 Id. 
180 A recent search for thermal imaging devices revealed a price tag between 
$2,000 and $27,000 per device.  Thermal Imaging Cameras, Thermal Imaging 
Scopes & More, OPTICSPLANET.COM, http://www.opticsplanet.com/heat-
seekers-termal-imagers.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).  But see Daniel Cooper, 
Modder Builds $150 Open-Source Thermal Imaging Camera To Help Insulate 
His House, ENGADGET (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.engadget.com/2012/09/03/
iphone-thermal-imaging/ (reporting on a developing $150 thermal imaging app 
for iPhone and Android devices). 
181 See Freiwald, supra note 20, at 713–14. 
182 David Joachim, Devices That Track Every Precious Need, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/technology/techspecial/09
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movements in public are actually exposed to private parties 
through the very technology used by law enforcement officers in 
Jones.183  Given this state of affairs, it is hard to make the case for a 
mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment based solely on social 
expectations to the extent they are a function of common practice.  
Even if such a case could be made with reference to present 
realities, it would have little staying power because surveillance 
and data aggregation technologies will only become more and 
more endemic over time.184 
There is another, perhaps more promising, response to Judge 
Sentelle’s mathematical objection.  Rather than concede that we 
have no expectations of privacy at all in the fragments of a mosaic, 
advocates might argue that we actually do have some reasonable 
expectations of privacy in our discrete public jaunts, but those 
meager interests just do not to come anywhere close to 
outweighing the significant law enforcement interests at stake in 
observing citizens in public places.  Although perhaps in tension 
with some of the language of cases like Knotts,185 adopting this 
view would make the arithmetic work.  It would also be consistent 
with the Court’s account of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a 
reasonable balance between law enforcement interests and 
citizens’ privacy interests.186  Practical problems would remain, of 
                                                 
postal.html (“Tracking devices that use the Global Positioning System have 
become so compact and inexpensive that some people are using them routinely 
to keep tabs on their most precious things.”). 
183 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
184 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case Against the Mosaic Theory, USVJONES.COM 
(June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-case-against-the-mosaic-
theory/ (warning that the mosaic theory cannot respond to changing 
technologies).  Assuming that the mosaic theory could be defended purely by 
reference to practical expectations, advocates appear to run full force into 
doctrinal problems, and particularly the problem of human surveillance.  See 
infra Part IV.B. 
185 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in 
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from one place to another.”). 
186 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 5. 
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course,187 but this account of the mosaic theory appears to resolve 
the conceptual concern. 
By far the most promising response to the argument that the 
sum of nothings cannot be something, however, is to take seriously 
the metaphor of the mosaic.  It may well be true that the “sum of 
an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero,”188 but mosaic 
advocates need not and do not make their case based on addition.189  
Quite to the contrary, their key claim is that the “whole” of one’s 
movements in public “reveals more—sometimes a great deal 
more—than does the sum of its parts.”190  The mosaic theory is, 
then, not an exercise in arithmetic.  Rather, it recognizes that, 
although a collection of dots is sometimes nothing more than a 
collection of dots, some collections of dots, when assessed 
holistically, are A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande 
Jatte.191  So, too, are our lives. 
As Justice Sotomayor observed in Jones, a “precise, 
comprehensive, record of a person’s public movements . . . reflects 
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious and sexual associations.”192  The tapestries of our lives are 
by definition an aggregation of events and activities that, when 
assessed discretely, or even iteratively, may have little 
significance.  When assessed holistically, however, these events 
not only tell a detailed story of our activities and associations, they 
may reveal who we are at a fundamental level and therefore expose 
opportunities for manipulation and control.  It may not take much.  
For example, according to one recent study, researchers were able 
to pierce the veil of anonymity cast over a body of locational data 
                                                 
187 See supra Part III.C. 
188 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
189  See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(applying the mosaic theory to aggregated surveillance). 
190 Id. at 558. 
191 Georges Seurat, A Sunday on La Grande Jatte – 1884, ART INST. OF CHI., 
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/27992?search_id=1&index=0 (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2013).  The painting is an example of pointillism, which is a 
technique defined by the use of individual dots to create an image.  Id. 
192  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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and identify particular users by referencing as few as four “spatio-
temporal points.”193  The mosaic theory’s core claim, then, is not 
that we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in flashing 
moments, or even in meaningless arithmetic concatenations of 
those events.  Rather, mosaic theorists argue that we have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of our lives, and 
therefore have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from constant, 
indiscriminate, and pervasive surveillance.194 
Building out from this core, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in Jones supports another important response to the arithmetic 
objection.  Fourth Amendment privacy is not an ethereal 
abstraction.  To the contrary, as a constituent of rights bundled 
together in the first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,195 
the negative rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment196 secure the 
space that is necessary to pursue the blessings of fundamental 
liberty.  As Justice Sotomayor points out, “Awareness that the 
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive 
freedoms.”197  Only by providing substantial privacy protections 
can we truly be at liberty to explore and pursue the good life as we 
conceive it.  Thus, Justice Sotomayor tells us, “GPS monitoring—
by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may 
alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that 
is inimical to democratic society.”198 
                                                 
193  Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, César A. Hidalgo, Michel Verleysen & 
Vincent D. Blondel, Unique in a Crowd:  The Privacy Bounds of Human 
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP., Mar. 25, 2013, at 1376, available at 
http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/full/srep01376.html 
194 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (concluding under the mosaic theory that 
aggregated surveillance is outside the reasonable expectation of privacy). 
195 U.S. CONST.  amends. I–VIII. 
196 U.S. CONST.  amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”). 
197 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
198 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Although this holistic account of the mosaic theory may 
answer Judge Sentelle’s mathematical concerns, it appears to run 
full force into conceptual objections raised by Orin Kerr that the 
mosaic engages a previously rejected diachronic account of the 
Fourth Amendment.199  Here, however, mosaic advocates have a 
ready response:  The objection misunderstands the thesis.  
Embracing a mosaic approach to assessing Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests does not require taking an equally holistic view of 
law enforcement conduct.  That is, it may be true that officer 
conduct during the course of an investigation does not constitute a 
“search” when assessed discretely, or even in the aggregate, but, 
nevertheless, may produce a mosaic of personal information that is 
sufficiently expansive and detailed to implicate reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  There is no doubt that this shift in focus 
from the conduct of law enforcement to the fruits of their 
investigative efforts raises serious practical problems when 
weighing Fourth Amendment interests.  After all, officers naturally 
want to be able to make prospective assessments of whether the 
Fourth Amendment will apply so they will know how to proceed.  
For now, however, it seems that a holistic framing of the mosaic 
theory can meet the major conceptual objections, at least insofar as 
it is treated as a way to understand Fourth Amendment interests 
and harms.  Whether and how the mosaic theory can be converted 
into a useful set of practices and policies is a separate matter, 
which we address below.200 
B.  Responding to Doctrinal Objections  
As we saw in the preceding section, the most persuasive way to 
conceptualize the mosaic theory is to focus on what aggregations 
of data reveal when assessed holistically rather than iteratively or 
additively.  So understood, the mosaic theory seems also to have 
promising responses to the doctrinal objections discussed in 
Part III.B.  
                                                 
199 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 315–20. 
200 See infra Part IV.C. 
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The first doctrinal challenge we saw in Part III came from the 
public observation doctrine.  How, critics wondered, can we square 
the rule from Knotts—that police officers are free to make any 
observations they care to from a place where they have a lawful 
right to be—with the proposition that, if officers see too much, 
then the Fourth Amendment is implicated? 201   Here again, 
advocates might be tempted to lean on Judge Ginsburg’s 
observation that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of 
a month is not actually exposed to the public because the 
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively 
nil.”202  As we saw above, however, this line of response actually 
threatens to maximize rather than minimize doctrinal damage.  
After all, the chances that any of us is being observed by law 
enforcement officers at any given time are also “effectively nil.”203  
Judge Ginsburg’s argument therefore seems to put at risk a host of 
one-off surveillance practices that are routine for most police 
officers, even if foreign and unexpected for many of their subjects. 
At any rate, Judge Ginsburg’s distinction relies on a false 
premise.  Despite our contrary expectations, it is increasingly the 
case that we are, in fact, being monitored much or most of the time 
by a combination of law enforcement officers, governmental 
regulators, and their legions of willing and unwilling private sector 
                                                 
201 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (citing the Government’s argument that the 
mosaic theory as applied to surveillance will hamper police investigations).  
According to the Government, “[such a proposition] logically would prohibit 
even visual surveillance of persons or vehicles located in public places and 
exposed to public view, which clearly is not the law.”  Brief of Respondent-
Appellee at 62, Maynard, Nos. 08-3030 and 08-3034 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2009), 
2009 WL 3126569 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)). 
202 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.  See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account 
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in 
the sum of one’s public movements.  I would ask whether people reasonably 
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that 
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
203 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
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agents.204  No matter how honestly held, then, the expectations that 
Judge Ginsburg cites are, on the whole, not reasonable insofar as 
reasonable expectations of privacy are indexed to reality.205 
All of this suggests that recognizing the mosaic theory would 
require abandoning or significantly modifying the public 
observation doctrine, 206  and perhaps the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test as well. 207  This is true even if the 
mosaic theory focuses on the enhanced privacy interests implicated 
by aggregations of data and information as a whole.  First, mosaics 
that trigger Fourth Amendment concerns can be aggregated in 
sundry ways, including by using multiple investigative 
techniques.208  Without additional guidance, conducting traditional 
surveillance for a day, a week, or a month might reveal too much.  
Similarly, a targeted, but short technologically-enhanced 
investigation might easily reveal enough to cross the threshold.  
Second, given the increasing ubiquity of what Christopher 
Slobogin has called “panvasive surveillance,” 209  defending a 
mosaic theory appears to require treating the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test as proscriptive rather than descriptive.  
Although attractive to many privacy advocates, that move would 
                                                 
204 See supra Part I. 
205  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that electronic 
monitoring of conversations in public telephone constitutes a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment); id. at 353, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”). 
206  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see also supra 
Part III.B (discussing the public observation doctrine and the reduced 
expectation of privacy while in public). 
207 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
208 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 334 (using Jones as an example by recounting 
that “[t]he government obtained cell phone location records, installed a public 
surveillance camera, and watched the suspects in public, all in addition to 
tapping phones and obtaining text messages”). 
209  Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, MISS. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2158935. 
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dramatically change the Fourth Amendment landscape, potentially 
reopening questions once thought settled.210 
The only way for mosaic theorists to avoid falling off this 
doctrinal cliff is to come forward with a clear evaluative test that 
law enforcement officers can deploy prospectively to reliably 
determine which investigative techniques they can employ, and to 
what extent, before triggering Fourth Amendment requirements.  
Thus, as we saw in the foregoing discussion of conceptual 
issues, 211 the focus quickly turns to the practicalities.  There is 
simply no doubt that adopting a mosaic theory of the Fourth 
Amendment will require modifying the public observation 
doctrine.  How much modification is required, and the type of 
adjustment needed, will be a function of the test advocates adopt.212 
In contrast with the inevitable confrontation that mosaic 
theorists must have with the public observation doctrine, any 
conflict with the third party doctrine is entirely avoidable.  It is by 
                                                 
210  See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (“The Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is 
designed to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement 
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Examples of previously settled questions that may 
be affected by a shift to proscriptive analysis include whether a bus passenger 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage, whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in garbage, and whether a customer has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in banking records.  See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 
U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (“Thus, a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag 
may be handled.  He does not expect that other passengers or bus employees 
will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.  But this is 
exactly what the agent did here.”); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35, 40 (1988) (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at 
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, 
snoops, and other members of the public.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442 (1976) (“The checks are not confidential communications but 
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”). 
211 See supra Part IV.A. 
212  Elsewhere, the authors propose and defend a “technology centered 
approach” that resolves these practical problems.  See Gray & Citron, supra note 
35. 
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now settled that the Fourth Amendment binds only state actors.213  
Thus, there is no constitutional barrier to private parties’ engaging 
in surveillance activities that would be subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulations if conducted by government officials. 214  
Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion in Jones that the Court might need 
to fundamentally reconsider the third party doctrine if it chooses to 
embrace the mosaic theory 215  is therefore not motivated by 
doctrinal necessity.  Rather, it reflects practical concerns that the 
privacy interests and harms identified by the mosaic theory will not 
be fully vindicated unless private actors are also subject to 
constraint or government agents are limited in terms of what 
information they can gather through third parties.   
This really involves two concerns.  The first is that law 
enforcement officers will simply circumnavigate the Fourth 
Amendment by subpoenaing from private parties information that 
the officers could not gather directly.  The second is that 
informational mosaics in the hands of private parties are no less 
invasive and objectionable for being in private rather than state 
hands.  In response to both concerns, promoters of the mosaic 
theory can simply maintain that worries about the absence of 
practical protections for informational mosaics in light of the third 
party doctrine are constitutionally gratuitous.  They are also not 
new.  Similar arguments have been raised before the Court when it 
has held the line on the third party doctrine.216  In most of these 
                                                 
213 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984) (holding that 
private actors are not bound by the Fourth Amendment unless working as agents 
of the state). 
214  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“By contrast, if long-term monitoring can be accomplished without 
committing a technical trespass—suppose, for example, that the Federal 
Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS 
tracking device in every car—the Court’s theory would provide no protection.”). 
215 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
216 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (ruling that the 
Fourth Amendment is not implicated when law enforcement places pen registers 
on numbers called by telephone customers); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (“[T]he mere maintenance of the records by the banks under 
the compulsion of the regulations invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right . . . .”); 
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cases, the political branches have responded, imposing legal 
limitations on the gathering, preservation, and sharing of 
information from banks, 217  telephone companies, 218  and e-mail 
providers.219  The Court is free to exercise the same restraint should 
it adopt the mosaic theory, and thereby avoid any entanglement 
with the third party doctrine.  Should it choose this more 
parsimonious path, it would go a long way toward silencing many 
mosaic critics.220 
C. Responding to Practical Concerns  
The foregoing analysis suggests that mosaic theorists have 
promising, if not always satisfying, responses to most of the 
conceptual and doctrinal objections that have so far been raised 
against the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.  Many of 
these responses are incomplete, however, in that they put 
considerable pressure on how the practical details are resolved.  
Therefore, whether the mosaic theory can provide a foundation for 
elaborating Fourth Amendment interests in response to developed 
and developing surveillance technologies is, in large part, a 
function of how well the mosaic theory can be translated into a set 
of coherent and workable rules and policies. 
                                                 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (refusing to recognize Fourth 
Amendment violation when private informant secretly taped conversations with 
defendant). 
217 See Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C.) (requiring banks 
to maintain secrecy of customer information except in certain circumstances). 
218 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121-27 (2012)) (setting forth 
requirements for law enforcement to obtain information about telephone 
communications). 
219 See id. 
220 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 350 (criticizing mosaic theory and arguing that 
the Court should exercise restraint in order to preserve space for the legislature 
to regulate contemporary surveillance technologies); Erin Elizabeth Murphy, 
The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System:  Information Disclosure, 
the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 485 (2013). 
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As courts put the mosaic theory into practice, the first line of 
challenges they will need to address are line-drawing problems.  
How are officers and courts to determine whether a particular 
informational mosaic contains enough information to implicate 
Fourth Amendment rights?  Does the quality of information in the 
mosaic come into play, or is it merely the quantity?  Does the 
method of acquisition matter?  How are police officers to know, 
prospectively, whether the Fourth Amendment applies, when, and 
what it demands?  All of these are important questions that 
ultimately feed back into the various conceptual and doctrinal 
issues already discussed. 
A good place for mosaic advocates to start is by pointing out 
that these sorts of line-drawing problems are not unique to the 
mosaic theory.  Rather, they are endemic to the Fourth Amendment 
itself. 221   The animating core of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.222  Reasonableness, in turn, requires a balancing of 
competing law enforcement and privacy interests.223  It is therefore 
no surprise that Fourth Amendment analysis is often more nuanced 
than it is definitive, or that Fourth Amendment tests tend to 
describe spectrums rather than bright lines.  Take, for example, the 
Court’s approach to probable cause, the threshold requirement that 
must be met before officers can engage in searches for evidence.  
Writing for the Court in Illinois v. Gates,224 then-Justice Rehnquist 
tells us that “probable cause is a . . . practical, nontechnical” 
standard and is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even 
                                                 
221 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (finding no 
surprise and little weight in “the unstartling proposition that when a line is 
drawn there is often not a great deal of difference between situations closest to it 
on either side”). 
222 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”). 
223 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance 
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify 
the intrusion.”). 
224 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”225  These are mushy 
standards indeed, and no doubt produce a range of reasonable, but 
conflicting, views among courts,226 not to mention angst in the law 
enforcement community.227  Despite these difficulties, the Court 
has yet to excuse officers or courts from responsibility for 
“slosh[ing] [their] way through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’ ”228   
It is hard to see how the line-drawing concerns raised by 
mosaic critics are any more worrisome than the line-drawing 
problems that are inherent to the Fourth Amendment.229  Although 
adopting the mosaic would likely lead to some growing pains,230 
there is no reason to think that courts and law enforcement officers 
are incapable of growth.  At any rate, fear of adjustment is no 
reason to leave a constitutional right unprotected, much less 
unrecognized.  Of course, if assessing aggregations of information 
and investigative procedures under a mosaic theory proves too 
difficult using the case-by-case, fact-centered approach favored by 
                                                 
225 Id. at 231–32. 
226  See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I do not regard today's holding as some momentous departure, but 
rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been 
with us for years . . . . There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our 
minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take.”); 
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1468 n.3 (1985) (describing United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1160 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) rev’d, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), a case in which four dissenting 
judges disagreed as to the appropriate standard for warrantless searches). 
227 See Bradley, supra note 226, at 1468–69 (“The Court's failure to provide 
such rules leads not only to the exclusion of evidence in cases involving the 
guilty, but also to intrusions upon the rights of both the innocent and the guilty 
by police who, faced with incomprehensibly complex rules either ignore them 
or, in their efforts to follow them, make mistakes which lead to evidentiary 
exclusion.”). 
228 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). 
229  See Jim Harper, Escaping Fourth Amendment Doctrine After Jones:  
Physics, Law, and Privacy Protection, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2011–2012, at 219, 
244, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-
court-review/2012/9/scr-2012-harper.pdf (criticizing the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy test” as overly subjective and confusing to courts). 
230 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 347. 
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the Court in other Fourth Amendment circumstances,231 then there 
is always the option of drawing bright lines.  It would not be the 
first time.  For example, the Court has adopted a bright(ish) line 
forty-eight-hour rule when assessing the reasonableness of 
municipal policies governing probable cause hearings after 
warrantless arrests.232  It has also excused law enforcement officers 
from the burden of showing independent probable cause, or any 
other additional justification, when conducting searches incident to 
arrest.233  If it is necessary to do so in order to vindicate Fourth 
Amendment rights, while avoiding thorny line-drawing problems, 
the Court could follow a similar course after adopting a mosaic 
theory. 
In some of his recent work, Christopher Slobogin has 
suggested just such a bright line approach to implementing the 
mosaic theory. 234   Under his proposal, which is presented as a 
model statute, any targeted “search”—defined succinctly as an 
“effort by government to find or discern . . . information about a 
specific person or circumscribed place” in connection with a 
known criminal event—would be subject to increasing constraint 
based on the aggregated time of that search. 235   Specifically, 
targeted searches, conducted by any means that last longer than 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 US 33, 39 (1996) (declining to impose a 
bright line rule requiring officers to inform suspects that they are free to go 
before pursuing a consensual interrogation); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567, 572 (1988) (declining to hold that investigatory pursuits always constitute 
Fourth Amendment “seizures”). 
232 Cnty. of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). 
233 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing for a search of a 
vehicle and the area in which an arrestee might lunge for a weapon).  The Court 
limited the bright line rule announced in Chimel in the context of searches of 
cars incident to arrest.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see also 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) (holding that an officer can 
search the vehicle that an arrestee recently exited); cf. United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus 
is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted.  
Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is 
probable cause to believe that it may be found.”) 
234 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 16. 
235 Id. at 17. 
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forty-eight hours in the aggregate, would require a warrant; 236  
searches that last between twenty minutes and forty-eight hours in 
the aggregate would require a court order;237 and searches that last 
fewer than twenty minutes in the aggregate would only require 
some good faith basis. 238   Targeted data searches, whether 
conducted directly or through third parties, would be subject to 
similar time constraints, with forty-eight hours again marking the 
trigger point for the warrant requirement.239   
The great virtue of Professor Slobogin’s proposal, as with other 
bright line approaches, is its clarity and ease of application.  That 
clarity comes with costs, of course, along some of the conceptual 
and doctrinal dimensions discussed above.  For example, Professor 
Slobogin’s proposal runs full-force into doctrinal concerns based 
on Knotts.  In particular, he draws no distinction between human 
surveillance and technologically enhanced surveillance. 240   Any 
court that adopted his approach would therefore need to effect 
pretty dramatic modifications to the public observation doctrine up 
to, and likely including, overturning Knotts.  After all, the 
surveillance in Knotts lasted longer than twenty minutes,241 which 
under Professor Slobogin’s proposal would require a court order.242  
A court adopting Professor Slobogin’s approach would also 
find itself confronted with conceptual and doctrinal objections 
based on the traditional synchronic approach to evaluating the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of law enforcement conduct.243  
That is because Professor Slobogin chooses duration of 
surveillance as the metric for measuring Fourth Amendment 
trigger points. 244   Additionally, he assesses surveillance time 
                                                 
236 Id. at 25. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 28. 
240 Id. at 19. 
241 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–80 (1983). 
242 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 25.  
243 See supra Part III.A. (describing the objections). 
244 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 26 (“Rules based on duration are easier to 
understand and abide by.  While precise time divisions such as those used in this 
provision are arbitrary in the sense that they apply regardless of how intrusive 
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inclusively,245 which also requires taking a diachronic, rather than 
synchronic, view of law enforcement conduct.   
Another difficulty with bright line approaches such as the one 
Professor Slobogin describes is that, ironically enough, they often 
ignore the actual mosaics of information aggregated by officers 
during a challenged investigation.  As a consequence, bright lines 
draw boundaries that are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.  
For example, with the benefit of sophisticated statistical analysis, 
officers may be able to develop very revealing mosaics of personal 
information by spot sampling personal data and GPS-enabled 
tracking information.246  As long as the aggregate of that sampling 
does not add up to more than twenty minutes, however, there 
would be no Fourth Amendment regulation if duration of 
surveillance was used to describe the Fourth Amendment 
boundary.247  The same can be said for short-term, but potentially 
revelatory, use of discrete surveillance technologies like drones.248  
Contrariwise, rather lengthy and unproductive human surveillance 
                                                 
the search actually is, time limitations as a method of defining constitutional 
protections have a solid pedigree.”). 
245 Id. at 25. 
246 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 333 (discussing GPS software that can take 
information at specific intervals).  It is entirely within the realm of possibility 
that police will soon have access to software that can cross-reference locational 
data with other records, such as credit cards, which would give further insight 
into a suspect’s actions.  Cf. Josh Constine, Facebook Beta Launches New 
Mobile Ad Network Using Your Data to Target You with Banner Ads in Other 
Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/18/
facebook-mobile-ad-network/ (explaining Facebook’s plan to merge off-site ads 
with biographical, locational, and social information provided by Facebook 
users for a more targeted advertising system). 
247 See Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 2012), 
http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-four-factor-test/ (finding the Alito 
concurrence in Jones an incomplete solution). 
248 See Marc Blitz, United States v. Jones – and the Forms of Surveillance 
That May Be Left Unregulated in a Free Society, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 
2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-of-
surveillance-that-may-be-left-unregulated-in-a-free-society/ (arguing that 
focusing only on long-term surveillance is an inadequate constitutional 
protection). 
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would require a warrant,249 even if it ultimately produced nothing 
close to the sort of informational mosaics that worried the 
concurring Justices in Jones. 
None of this is meant to condemn Professor Slobogin’s 
proposal, of course.  Rather, the point is that, precisely because 
solutions for the conceptual and doctrinal challenges to the mosaic 
lean so heavily on the practicalities of implementation, any 
approach that is adopted will have conceptual and doctrinal 
consequences. 250  The upshot is that compromises, conflict, and 
adjustment are inevitable.  As with all Fourth Amendment 
questions, the test of success will be whether efforts to implement 
the mosaic theory can accomplish a reasonable balance between 
law enforcement goals and privacy interests. 251   Reaching that 
balance has been a constant struggle since 1791.252  There is no 
reason to hope or expect that it will be any simpler in the coming 
years as advocates and critics work through the potential and 
consequences of a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to advance debates after United 
States v. Jones about the conceptual, doctrinal, and practical issues 
that attend the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.  The 
discussion has not produced a clear conclusion.  Rather, the goal 
has been to elaborate the major objections raised against the 
mosaic theory to provide guidance for mosaic advocates.  
Although it is beyond the scope of the present Article to advance a 
                                                 
249 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 27–28. 
250 See id. at 36. 
251 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”); supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
252 The Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was first ratified in 
1791.  See 2 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 81 (2013); see M. Blane Michael, Reading the 
Fourth Amendment:  Guidance from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 905, 907–19 (2010) (outlining the history of the Fourth Amendment and 
how this history has informed its interpretation). 
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mosaic-based proposal, the core insights that drive the theory 
warrant that further development.253  At its core, the mosaic theory 
documents perfectly reasonable expectations that we will not be 
forced to live in a surveillance state or to abide constant, 
indiscriminate surveillance conducted by the Government or its 
private proxies. 254 That this expectation has firm footing in the 
Fourth Amendment we take to be a proposition that is 
constitutionally unproblematic.255  The devil may well be in the 
details, but to the extent the mosaic theory is understood as a way 
to conceptualize these privacy interests and corollary privacy 
harms, the game is well worth the candle. 
  
                                                 
253 The authors develop and defend our own positive proposal elsewhere.  See, 
e.g., Gray & Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, supra note 36. 
254 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
255 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 12. 
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